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A DYNAMIC GAME OF R AND D: PATENT PROTECTION AND 
COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR1 
JENNIFER F. REINGANUM 
A theory of dynamic optimal resource allocation to R and D in an n-firm industry is 
developed using differential games. This technique represents a synthesis of the analytic 
methods previously applied to the problem: static game theory and optimal control. The 
use of particular functional forms allows the computation and detailed discussion of the 
Nash equilibrium in investment rules. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
THIS PAPER ADDRESSES THE PROBLEM of resource allocation to research and 
development. Among the important issues that a firm engaging in R and D must 
evaluate are: uncertainty regarding the feasibility and profitability of a particular 
innovation; the possibility of a protracted development period; the possibility 
that a rival firm may innovate first, capturing either a patent or a significant 
share of the new market; the possibility that a rival firm may imitate the 
innovation and appropriate some of the profits in the new market. 
In what follows, we will develop a theory of optimal resource allocation to 
research and development which incorporates the aspects of R and D enumer­
ated above. We will use a dynamic game theoretic analysis, determining the 
Nash equilibrium strategies for n identical firms. The availability of perfect 
patent protection is shown to accelerate development of the innovation, and the 
effect of increasing rivalry is addressed. The impact of increasing rivalry on Nash 
equilibrium investment in R and D depends upon the degree of appropriability 
of rewards. If patent protection is perfect, then increasing the number of Nash 
rivals results in increased R and D effort. However, when imitation is rewarded, 
the opposite may be true. Finally, some notions of competitive and perfectly 
competitive equilibrium are examined in the context of the model developed 
below. 
2. BACKGROUND 
The term "research and development with rivalry" is used to describe the 
situation in which firms compete for the profits generated by a particular 
innovation. More specifically, we will focus on situations in which n � 2 firms 
are rivals in developing a new process or device. This rivalry may be enhanced or 
diminished by the number of rivals and by the availability of patent protection. 
As a result of uncertainty regarding the timing of successful innovation, firms 
must make contingency plans for investing in research and development. Since a 
firm can be pre-empted at any time by a rival firm, a reasonable model of 
1 This paper is based on sections of my doctoral dissertation. I would like to thank Morton I. 
Kamien, Nancy L. Schwartz, and John Roberts for their comments and encouragement. 
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induced technical change must allow firms to adjust their expenditures as a result 
of the temporal resolution of market uncertainty. 
Basically two alternative approaches have been used to analyze R and D with 
rivalry: (i) a game theoretic analysis (e.g., Scherer [11], Loury [9], Lee and Wilde 
[8], Dasgupta and Stiglitz [2, 3)), which is static in the sense that each firm 
chooses its investment strategy from a subset of R +; (ii) a decision theoretic
analysis by Kamien and Schwartz [5, 6, 7], which is dynamic in the sense that 
each firm chooses a function, a time path of spending on R and D. 
The model developed in this paper combines the two approaches described 
above. Rivals will be modeled as strategic agents, as in the game theoretic 
analysis. In addition, they will be assumed to choose strategies which may be 
expressed as functions of time, as in the decision theoretic analysis. 
We here make the distinction between "knowledge" and "information" to be 
retained throughout; "knowledge" will always be used to indicate facts relevant 
to the firms' perfection of the innovation. That is, what they know about their 
research project is knowledge. What they know about each other is "in­
formation." The structure of payoffs, probability distributions, and strategy 
spaces constitutes information. Hence the phras_e "complete information" implies 
that each player knows all payoff functions, probability distributions, and 
strategy spaces. The phrase "private knowledge" indicates that rival firms do not 
know the particular facts and findings of a given firm's research. Throughout this 
paper we will assume private knowledge. The case where research findings are a 
pure public good is examined in Reinganum [10].
3. THE MODEL 
Assume that there are a number of firms engaged in a race for a particular 
technological breakthrough-an invention or process. 
DEFINITION l: We say that player i succeeds if i perfects the device or process. 
DEFINITION 2: We say that player i wins if i succeeds before any rival does. 
If firm i wins the race, then i receives a payoff for being the innovator. If firm i 
succeeds, but is not the first to succeed, then i receives an imitator's payoff. If 
firm i fails to succeed, then it gains nothing. In any case, i forfeits its research 
investment to date. 
Each player is assumed to accumulate knowledge relevant to the innovation by 
expending resources on research activity or knowledge acquisition. The knowl­
edge acquisition process is assumed to be deterministic. Successful innovation, 
however, is assumed not deterministic. Rather, the date of successful completion 
of the project is a random variable which is influenced, but not determined, by 
firm investment im knowledge acquisition. 
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Notation and Definitions 
This paper follows the notation of Reinganum [10].
N l. n is the number of firms, indexed by i; n is assumed to be at least 2 .
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N2. Tis the calendar date of Doomsday. Alternatively, T may be regarded as 
a time at which the firms abandon the project entirely if they haven't yet 
perfected the innovation. That is, if a firm fails to succeed by T, it becomes 
convinced that the innovation is infeasible. 
N3. r is the discount rate common to all players.
N4. P1.( t) is the present value of the innovation to the innovator or "leader" 
who wins at t. For convenience we will assume that this present value is the 
constant P v independent of the date of success. 
NS. Pp(t) is the present value of the reward to an imitator or "follower." 
Again, let us assume that PF( t) = PF, independent of the date of success. We 
further assume that imitation is costless and immediate, and PF� PL. Because 
the rewards to innovation and imitation are constant in present value terms, the 
incentives to invest are focused upon the possibility of a rival's prior success. 
N6. t; is the time at which firm i succeeds.
N7. /L;(t) is firm i's rate of knowledge acquisition at t; /L;(t) represents the
additional relevant knowledge that i chooses to acquire at time t. We further 
assume that /L;(t) E [O, B] where B is a positive constant. That is, there is an 
exogenous physical limit upon the rate at which knowledge can be acquired. 
N8. e-rtc;(µ,;) is the discounted cost of additional knowledge /L; acquired at t; 
we assume throughout that c;( µ,;) = (l /2)( µ-;)2• In fact, the generalization to any
constant elasticity cost function is straightforward and yields identical qualitative 
results. 
N9. z;(t) is firm i's accumulated relevant knowledge at time t. Hence i;(t)
= /L;(t), where the dot denotes the time derivative. We assume that z;(O) = 0. The
bounds on µ,;(t) imply that z;(t) must lie in Z; = [O, TB] for all t in [O, T]. Any
base of relevant knowledge acquired earlier is reflected instead in firm i's 
probability of success. 
NlO. F;(z) is the probability that firm i succeeds in perfecting the device or
process with accumulated relevant knowledge of z or less. F;(z) may be inter­
preted as an objective distribution or a subjective distribution upon which all 
players agree. We will specify that F;(z) = 1 - e-"Az. The use of the exponential
distribution is convenient and facilitates comparison of this study with those 
cited earlier, which also employ the exponential distribution to represent market 
or technological uncertainty. 
Under the subjective distribution interpretation, the exponential distribution 
represents an extremely "diffuse" prior since, given no success to date, each 
increment to knowledge is equally likely to be the one which provides success. 
N 11. Since z;(t) is a function of time, a probability distribution is induced
over t;. The probability that firm i succeeds at or before t is 
t E (0, T]. 
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In addition, the conditional probability that firm i will succeed in the next 
instant, given that it has not already done so, is 
pr { l; E (t, t + dt]J t; > t} = 'Aµ;(t)dt, t E (0, T].
Notice that the instantaneous conditional probability of success depends upon 
the rate of knowledge acquisition selected. 
Nl2. Vectors will be denoted by an unsubscripted letter; for instance z = 
(z1,Z2, ... 'Zn).It is difficult to obtain results for general differential games. This formulation 
is meant to be suggestive of results which might be expected to hold under more 
general circumstances. 
Because the model will be formulated in terms of both a game and a dynamic 
optimization problem, the following definitions are offered in an attempt to 
avoid confusion. 
DEFINITION 3: The strategy space for i is 
6ll,; = { u;( t, z) J u;(t, z) E [O, B], u;( t, z) is continuous in ( t, z)
and lu;(t , z) - u;(t , E) I � a(t)Jz - El for some
nonnegative, integrable a(t), for all 
( t, z)E[0, T]XZ1X ··· XZn}· 
A pure strategy for i is an element of 6ll,;· 
Thus a pure strategy for i is a function of both time and the current levels of 
knowledge. This type of strategy is referred to as a closed-loop strategy. 
DEFINITION 4: A control function for i P,;(t) is a continuous function taking
values in the control space U; = [O, B] for all t in [O, T]. 
DEFINITION 5: The kinematic equations are a system of equations which govern 
the evolution over time of the state variables z1,z2, • • •  , zn. The kinematic equations depend on the players' strategies: 
i; = g;( t' z, u) (i = l, 2, . . . , n).
For any pure strategy n-tuple (u1(t, z), . . .  , un(t, z)), the kinematic equations
become a system of ordinary differential equations: 
(l) i; = g;( t, z, u(t, z)) (i = 1,2, . . .  , n).
DEFINITION 6: A solution to the system (1) through given initial conditions is a
differentiable curve z(t) = (z1(t), . . .  , zn(t)) defined for all t in [O, T] such that
i;(t) = g;(t, z(t)), i = 1,2, .. . , n, and such that z(t) satisfies the given initial
conditions. 
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In our case g;(t,z) = u;(t, z) where u;(t, z) is any pure strategy for i. By
theorems from differential equations (see, e.g., Friedman [4, pp. 4-5]) , the
assumptions of continuity, boundedness, and the Lipschitz conditions in z are 
sufficient to guarantee the existence of a unique solution to the system (1) 
through z(O) = 0. 
DEFINITION 7: The control functions associated with a particular strategy n­
tuple (u1(t, z), . . .  , un(t, z)) are 
(µ1(t), µ2(!), . . . , P.n( t)) = (u1(t, z( t)), u2(t, z(t)), . . .  , un(t, z( t))),
where z(t) is the solution of the system i = u(t, z) through z(O) = 0. 
In order to define the game, we must specify the players' strategy spaces 6ll,; 
and their payoffs f(u1, • • •  , un), for i = 1,2, . . .  , n. We have defined 6ll,; in
Definition l above.
The payoff to player i consists of three terms: firm i receives the amount PL (in
present value terms) at t if no firm has yet succeeded and if i succeeds at t (given 
that it has not yet succeeded). That is, firm i receives PL at t with probability
exp{ -"AL:zk(t)}'Aµ;(t). Furthermore, since imitation is costless and immediate,
firm i receives an imitator's payoff PF at t if no firm has succeeded by t and if
any other firm succeeds at t (given that it has not already succeeded). That is, 
firm i receives present value PF at t with probability exp{ -"AL:zk(t)} · 
[LN;'Aµ;(t)]. However, development costs of (l/2)(µ;(t))2 accompany research
activity so long as no player has succeeded. That is, firm i incurs costs of 
( l/2)( µ;(t))2 with probability exp{ -"AL:zk(t)}. Combining these terms and dis­
counting the flow costs at rate r, we can write firm i's payoff for any strategy 
n-tuple (u1, • • •  , un) as follows: 
Ji(u1, . . .  , un) = i
T
{ PLe-i-.L,zk(t)Aµ;(t) + PFe->-.L,zk(t) 2:; 'AµJ(t)0 1*' 
- e-rte-A2:zk(l)(1/2)( P,;(1))2
} 
dt
where µ;(t) = u; (t, z(t)) and z(t) solves i = u(t, z) with z(O) = 0. We use the ab­
breviated ( u 1, • • •  , un) to represent the entire strategy n-tuple ( u 1( t , z ) ,
. . .  , un(t, z)) over all of [O, T] X Z1 X · · · X Zn.
It will prove more convenient to integrate the first term of the payoff by parts 
and deal with the resulting equivalent payoffs: 
P(u1 , • • •  , un) = fo
T
{ [ PL(l - e-Az;(I)) + PFe -A.z;(t ) ] ex� { ->-. 
k
�/k( t) } 
X 2:
_
A.µ.1( t) - e-rte-A2:zk(l)(l/2)( P,;(t))2} dt
1*' 
for i = 1,2, . . .  , n.
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4. THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM 
In order to propose a method of solution, we must first decide upon the 
players' behavioral attitudes. We assume that each firm maximizes its own 
payoff, taking its rivals' strategies as given. This assumption results in the Nash 
equilibrium concept. 
DEFINITION 8: A strategy n-tuple (uf,uf, ... , u:) is a Nash equilibrium if
(a) 
and 
(b) 
u;*(t,z) E 621; (i = 1, 2, . . . , n);
Ji( * * * * *) > Ji( * * * *) U1 ,  • . •  , U;-1,U; ,Ui+I> • . •  , Un = U1 , • . .  , U;_1,U;,U;+I• . • •  , Un 
for all u; E 621;, i = l, 2, . . . , n.
Define the value functions 
X 2, A.µ,/ -e-rte-,\kzk(t)( l /2)( µ,;* ( t) )2 } dt
]"Fl 
+PL( l - e-ilz,(T))exp {-A. 2, zk( T)},
kfal 
where y = z(s). 
Then from Theorem 8. 2. 2  (Friedman [4]), we know that (uf, ... , u:) must
satisfy a system of Bellman equations: for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, 
(2) V/(t,z) + max 
[ 
v:(t,z)u;(t,z) + 2: v;(t,z)u/(t,z)u;(t,z)E[O,B] jfai 1 
+ [ PL(l - e-ilz,) + PFe-.\z']exp {-A. 2: zk} 
kfal 
X 2; A.u/(t,z)- e -r1 exp {-A.2:zk }
jfai 
X (1/2)(u;(t,z))2 ] = 0 (i = 1, 2, . . . , n). 
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Then by the definition of V;(s, y), for all z
(3) V;(T,z) =PL exp {-A. k�/k} -PL exp { -A.2:zk }·
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The candidates for a Nash equilibrium can be obtained by performing the 
indicated maximization. Since the left hand side of equation (2) is strictly
concave in u;, the necessary conditions are also sufficient for maximization: 
{=� 
<0 
for all 
implies 
for all 
u;( t, z) E [ 0, BJ implies u;* (t, z) = B, 
u*(t z) = V;(t z)er1e.\kzkl ' z, ' ' 
u;(t,z) E [O,BJ implies u;*(t,z) =0, 
for i = 1, 2, . . .  , n.
The first-order conditions indicate that if the optimal rate of knowledge 
acquisition is to be within the interval (0, B ), then the discounted expected
marginal cost rate must be exactly balanced by the incremental expected profit 
to the firm generated by that rate of expenditure. If such a balance cannot be 
struck, then the appropriate boundary conditions determine the optimal rate of 
knowledge acquisition. 
It is difficult to describe the Nash equilibrium strategies without solving 
explicitly for the value functions. 
Suppose we concentrate on interior solutions, where u;*(t, z) E (0, B) for all
( t, z) E [O, T] X Z 1 X · · · X Zn. If we substitute the expressions 
back into the Bellman system (2)-(3) and if we can solve the resulting system of
Hamilton-Jacobi equations for the value functions V1(t,z) through Vn(t,z), then
we can determine the Nash equilibrium (candidate) strategies via the substitution 
u;*(t,z) = u?(t,z, V,(t,z)). 
Substituting the expressions ( u?, ... , u�) into system (2) and simplifying yields
(4) 
+ [ PL(e.\z; _ 1) + PF]A. 2: V{e'1= 0,
jfai , 
for i = 1 ,  2, . . .  , n, with terminal conditions (3). 
This suggests a solution of the form 
(5) 
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i = 1,2, ... , n. Substituting the appropriate partial derivatives into (4) and
collecting terms gives 
exp
{ 
-A. 2:zk }[ 6 (t) + (b(t))2A2er1(2n -1)/2 
+b(t)(n -l)(PL -PF )A2e'1] + exp {-,\ 2: zk } 
k'f't 
X [ ii(t) + a(t)b(t)(n -1),\2er1 -,\2b(t)PL(n -l)er1J = 0. 
Since exp{ -,\2:zk} and exp{ -,\2:k7"izd are always positive, the coefficient
functions b(t) and a(t) must solve the ordinary differential equations and
boundary conditions 
(6) 
(7) 
6 (t) + (b(t))2,\2ert(2n -1)/2 + b(t)(n -l)(PL -PF )A2ert = 0, 
b(T) = -PL. 
ii(t) + a(t)b(t)(n -1),\2er1 -b(t)PL(n -l),\2er1 = 0,
a(T) =PL. 
Equation (6) can be reduced to a linear ordinary differential equation via the
substitution g(t) = -1/ b(t), and therefore has the unique solution through
b(T) = -Pv 
-2(n -l)(P -P )P 
b p 
L F L 
(t;- L)= 
(2n-1)PL-[PL+2(n-l)PF]exp{m(t)}'
where m(t) =(PL -PF)(n -l),\2(er1 - erT)/ r. Notice that if PL� PF, then
b (t; -PL) < 0 for all t � T. 
The second coefficient must solve (7). The general solution to this nonhomo­
genous linear ODE is a(t; PL)= PL. 
We can now write the value functions for n identical Nash rivals:
We can now state the following proposition. 
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PROPOSITION 1: Suppose B � PL,\e'r. When imitation is rewarde d by 
PF(< PL), 
(a) 
i = l, 2, ... , n, is the unique Nash equilibrium in GU,1 X · · · X GU,n· 
(b) 
; 2(PL -PF )PL(n -1)J (Ur, · · · , u:) = p L - [ ] (2n -l)PL - PL+ 2(n - I)PF exp{m(t)} 
i = l, 2, .. . , n. 
PROOF (a): Clearly (uf, ... , u:) E Gll,1 X · · · X GU,n. We presented a continu­
ously differentiable solution ( V1(t,z;PvPF), ... , vn(t,z;PvPF)) to the system
(3)-(4). By construction, V ; (t, z; Pv PF) and u ;*(t,z) = v; (t, z; P v PF) e'1eft.2,z. 
satisfy the hypotheses of the sufficiency Theorem I (Stalford 'and Leitmann [12]).
Therefore (uf(t,z;PvPF), ... , u:(t,z;PvPF)) as above is a Nash equilibrium.
Since the left-hand side of system (4) is of class C00 in (t,z, Vz) and since the
terminal functions in (3) are of class C 00 in z, by Theorem 18. l (Bernstein [1 ]},
there is only one solution to (3)-(4). Thus (uf(t,z; PvPF), .. . , u:(t,z; PvPF)) 
as defined above is the unique Nash equilibrium in GU,1 X · · · X GU,n·
PROOF (b): The value of profits obtained by playing the Nash equilibrium 
strategies are J;(uf, ... , u:) = V;(O, O; Pv PF) for i = 1, 2, ... , n. Q.E.D.
The case of perfect patent protection is of especial interest, since it is by far the 
case most commonly examined. Denote the patent value by P. Then PL= P 
while PF= 0. 
COROLLARY 1: The Nash equilibrium strategi es unde r  pe rfect patent protection
are 
2,\(n -l)Per1 
u;*(t,z;P,O) = ---------------
. 2n -1- exp { P,\2(n -l)(e'' - e'T)/ r}
(i = 1,2, ... , n). 
Due to the "memorylessness" property of the exponential distribution, the 
control functions associated with the Nash equilibrium strategies are the strate­
gies themselves. That is, the Nash equilibrium strategies are functions of time 
only. This result is of some interest on technical grounds. Since Nash equilibria 
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in closed-loop and open-loop strategies do not coincide in general, this mode_ 
represents a class of such solvable games. On the other hand, this result will not 
generalize to alternative distribution functions.
The control function P,;*(t) is the additional knowledge acquired by firm i at t. 
The cost of this knowledge is ( l  /2)( µ,;*( t))2• To determine whether firms invest at 
a higher or lower rate as time progresses, we need to determine the sign of 
c;( P,;*(t)). 
PROPOSITION 2: C;( p,;*(t)) > 0 for all t � T. 
PROOF: Differentiate and collect terms. 
COROLLARY 2: We can now note that the instantaneous conditional probability of 
success AP,;*(t) is an increasing Junction of time. That is, as time passes, it becomes 
increasingly likely that firm i will succeed in the next time increment dt, given that 
it has not yet succeeded. 
The following proposition summarizes the effects of varying the payoffs to 
innovator and imitator. 
PROPOSITION 3: For PL> PF, (a) au;* jaPL > 0 for all t � T; that is, an 
increase in the payoff to the innovator stimulates firm i to proceed at a Jaster rate; 
(b) au;* /a PF< 0 for all t < T with au;* /a PF= 0 at t = T; that is, an increase in 
the payoff to imitation causes the firm to reduce its equilibrium rate of knowledge 
acquisition. 
PROOF (a): Let m(t) =(PL - PF)(n - l)A2(e,-1 - err)/ r. Notice that m(t) � 0 
for all t � T. 
where h(m) = Pf(2n - l )  +em {Pf(m - 1) + 2PLPF(n - l)(m - 2) + 2P](n -
l )}. Then sgn au;* /aPL = sgn h(m). Now 
h(O) = Pf (2n - 1) - Pi - 4PLPF (n - 1) + 2P}(n - l)
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for all m ;;:; 0 ( t ;;:; T) and PL > PF· Thus as m decreases, h ( m) increases from 
2(n - l)(PL - PF)2• Therefore h(m) > 0 for all m � 0 (t;;:; T), and claim (a) 
follows. 
PROOF (b): 
2PL( n - l )Ae'y( m) 
au;*/aPF= ---------------
((2n - l)PL - [ PL+ 2(n - l)PF ] em)2
'
where y(m) = PLem(2n - l - m) - (2n - I)PL - 2PF(n - l) mem. Then 
sgn au1* /a PF= sgn y(m). Now y(O) = 0 and 
y'(m) =em {2(n - l)(PL - PF ) - (PL+ 2(n - l)PF )m} > 0
for all m;;:; 0. Thus as m decreases, y(m) decreases from y(O) = 0. Therefore 
au;* /a PF< 0 for all t < T, while au;* /3PF = 0 at t = T. Q.E.D. 
From this proposition, it is clear that firms will generate knowledge at a 
uniformly higher rate when patent protection is perfect than when protection is 
imperfect. Formally, we have the following corollary. 
COROLLARY 3: For PL< P, PF S; 0,
u;* (t, z; P, 0) > u;* (t, z; P0 PF ) for all t ;;:; T. 
This corollary confirms our intuition that firms will expend greater effort if 
they can be assured of collecting the entire reward. 
Consider the limiting case PL = PF· In a deh:rministic game, if imitation and 
innovation are equally rewarded, then Nash equilibrium will fail to exist, with 
each firm preferring to imitate rather than innovate. This is not the case in the 
presence of technological uncertainty. Taking the limit as PL decreases to PF 
(using l'Hopital's rule) yields the Nash equilibrium strategies when innovation 
and imitation are equally rewarded: 
(i = 1, .. .  , n).
In the presence of technological uncertainty, a firm cannot simply wait for its 
rival to innovate, since given the rivals' strategies, there remains a positive 
probability that no rival will succeed within the planning horizon. If a firm wants 
any payoff, its optimal strategy is to pursue the payoff actively, rather than 
simply to wait for a rival to succeed and then reap the reward to imitation. 
Further comparative statics results are summarized below. 
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PROPOSITION 4: (a) Jf PL > 4P F(n - l)e-1/2 /[2n - 1 - 2e-112], then au;*jaA.
> O for all t � T; (b) otherwise au;* /aA. � 0 for some t; however, au;* /aA. > 0 near
t = T. 
PROOF (a): For PL> PF, 
2PL(n - l)(PL - PF )e'1 [ (2n - l)PL + aem(2m - l) ]
au;* /a"A = 
2[ (2n - l)PL - aem ] 
where a= PL+ 2(n - l )PF and m(t) = (PL  - PF) A.2(e'1 - e'
T)/ r. Let f(m)
= (2n - I)PL + aem(2m - 1). Then sgn au;* /aA. = sgn f(m) . Now j'(m)� 0 as
m-? - 1/2, so f(m) attains a minimum at m = -1/2. But f(- 1/2) > 0 under
(a): Therefore f(m) > 0 for all m, implying that au;* /aA. > 0 for all t � T. 
PROOF (b): For PF< PL� 4PF(n - l)e-112 /[2n - l - 2e-112], f( - 1/2) � 0,
so au* /aA. � O in a neighborhood of m = - 1/2; but f(O) = 2(n - l)(PL - PF) 
> 0, ;o au;* /aA. > 0 when m = 0 (t = T). Q.E.D. 
For the limiting case of PL= PF, 
. 2PFe '1 [ 2 + (2n - l)m ] 
au*/ aA. = -�__::__  ___:_ __ --=-, 
[ 2 - (2n - 1 )m ]2 
where m(t) = PFA.2(e'1 - e'T)/ r. Thus au;* /aA. � 0 for all m � - 2/(2n - l); but
au;* /aA. > 0 at m = 0 (t = T). . The impact of a decrease in the mean level of knowledge reqmre� for success,
l /A., is complicated by the possibility of imperfect patent pro
.
tectlo� . :ar� (a)
indicates that if innovation is sufficiently highly rewarded (relative to 1m1tat10n), 
then firms will invest at a uniformly higher rate in projects which require (on 
average) less knowledge. In particular, this is true for the case of �erfe�t patent
protection. However, in the extreme case where pat�nt protection 1s totally
ineffective, throughout most of the horizon firms would mvest at a higher rate on 
a project requiring (on average) more knowledge. 
PROPOSITION 5: (a) a U;* I a T < 0 for all t � T; as the planning horizon increases'
firms spread out their R and D effort over the extende� horizon . . (b) Howev�r,
az;*(T)/aT > O; maximum planned knowledge accumulatwn z; (T) increases with 
T. 
PROOF (a): Differentiate and collect terms. 
PROOF (b): Find z;*(T) using i; = u;* and z; (O) = 0. Then differentiate and 
collect terms. 
At this point we can remark that the infinite horizon case �an. �
e exan:iined via
a limiting argument. The Nash equilibrium strategies for the mfm1te honzon case 
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In this section we have been able to determine the Nash equilibrium strategies
and the nature of their dependence upon most of the parameters. An exception is
the discount rate r. The sign of au;* /ar is not uniform over time. Instead there
may be multiple discontinuities in the functions sgn aut ;ar. 
In the following section, we examine the dependence of the Nash equilibrium
strategies upon the number of rivals. 
5. rs COMPETITION CONDUCIVE TO TECHNICAL ADVANCE? 
This question has been asked-and answered differently-many times. Part of
the confusion must lie with the vagueness of the term "competition." Does
"competition" (or rivalry) consist of a behavioral attitude or the number of firms
in the industry? The players in this paper are competitive in the sense that they
are non cooperative. Yet if patent protection is perfect, while all firms compete
for the patent, there will be no competitors (or imitators) once the innovator
succeeds. If patent protection is imperfect, then there is competition for rewards
as well as for the perfection of the innovation. That is, the firms are competitors
both before and after successful innovation. 
In this study, we will assume Nash behavior and "increasing competition" or
"increasing rivalry" will refer to increasing the number of these rivals. 
With few exceptions (Kamien and Schwartz [5, 7]), the recent literature on R 
and D with rivalry focuses on the case of perfect patent protection. To facilitate
comparison of the results of this study with those of others, we will temporarily
restrict our analysis to the perfect patent protection case.
Although Kamien and Schwartz do not explicitly include the number of rivals
in their analysis [7], because their firm possesses a subjective probability distribu­
tion function over the collectivity of its rivals' introduction date-assumed to be
exponential with parameter h-it seems reasonable that an increase in the
number of rivals would result in an increase in the subjective parameter h. Since
1 / h is the expected time until innovation occurs, it is reasonable that more firms
should decrease this expression. In a recent paper, Kamien and Schwartz [7]
show that, for the case of perfect patent protection and no technological
uncertainty, either (i) increasing h always results in a lengthening of the develop­
ment period; or (ii) increasing h initially decreases the choice of developmentperiod. However, after some point h* increased rivalry results in a lengthening of
the optimal development period for an individual firm using a decision theory
analysis. 
In his recent game theoretic model Loury [9] uses the exponential distributionto represent technological uncertainty. In particular, each firm i has probabilityI - exp ( - h(x,)t) of success by time t. Thus firm i faces a probability that arival has succeeded by t of I - e-a,i where a = ". h(x.) h(x.) is the parameterI ,:;;.,Fl=' J ' J 
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from j's distribution and x is firm j's choice of R and D expenditures. Thus for
symmetric firms, a;= (n -1 l) h(x). Since x1 is taken as given, �irm i reg�rds a; as
a parameter. Then "increasing rivalry" is taken to be an mcrease m n, the
number of firms in the industry. Loury finds that, in equilibrium, an increase inn
unambiguously causes a decrease in x;*. However, given a certain stability
condition, industry investment nx;* increases with n. That is, increased rivalry
results in an earlier innovation date (on average) even though individual firm
investment declines. 
Loury's firms choose the level of resources they wish to expend, X;; this buys
them a distribution 'T;(x;) over the time of their actual success. Notice that the
amount X; is a sunk cost once time passes t = 0. That is, if a firm succeeds at
t = € > O, then the other firms are unable to limit their losses to the expenditures
to date. Thus increased rivalry has no effect on i's expected costs. However, the
expected reward declines with the addition of rivals since now firm i has less
chance of capturing the patent. Under these circumstances it is not surprising
that firms choose to invest a lower amount should additional rivals appear. 
Lee and Wilde's [8] modification of Loury's model reverses this result. That is,
if instead of a fixed cost of X;, a flow cost of X; is paid only until some firm wins,
and if the random time of success depends upon the magnitude of this flow cost,
then both expected benefits and expected costs decline as the number of rivals
increases. The resulting impact on equilibrium investment x;* is positive-as the 
number of rivals increases, each invests at a higher rate x;*.
Since, in reality, firms can (and would) cease development if a rival preempts
them (and patent protection is perfect), it seems more reasonable that both firm
i's expected rewards and its expected costs will decline as rivalry increases. The
model developed in this paper allows such flexibility.
Recall that when patent protection is perfect, each of n identical firms plays
the Nash equilibrium strategy
2PA.( n - 1 )e'r 
u* ( t z· P 0) = ______ ::__ ::__ _ --=---:-' · ' ' ' 2n - 1 - exp { PA.2(n - l)(e'r - e'T)/r } 
In order to determine the effect of increased rivalry (as represented by an 
increase in the number of firms) on individual investment, we treat n as a 
continuous parameter and examine 'du;* /'dn. 
PROPOSITION 6: Suppose n � 2. Then 
a U;* I an > 0 for all t < T and a U;* I an = 0 at t = T.
That is, an increase in the number of Nash rivals results in an increase in each 
firm's individual equilibrium investment in R and D. A fortiori an increase in the 
number of rivals tends to hasten technical advance. 
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PROOF: Let m(t) = PA.2(n - l)(e'r - e'T)/r. Note that m(t) < 0 whenever 
t < T. 
2PA.e'r [ 1 - em(l - m) J 
au* ;an = ---'---------"'-' 
(2n - 1 - em)2 
• 
Let g(m) = 1 - em(l - m). Now sgn 'Clu;* /an= sgn g(m). But g(O) = 0 and g'(m)
= mem < 0 for all t < T. Therefore g(m) > 0 for all t < T and g(O) = 0 at t = T. 
The proposition follows. Q.E.D. 
Although all of the models mentioned here-Kamien and Schwartz [7], Loury 
[9], Lee and Wilde [8], and the current model-are remarkably similar, we have 
arrived at a variety of conclusions regarding the impact of additional rivals on 
individual equilibrium investment in R and D. The current model is in agree­
ment with Lee and Wilde on this point. As discussed earlier, it is the assumption 
that the date of success depends upon fixed rather than flow costs which is 
responsible for the discrepancy between the results of this study and those of 
Loury. The disagreement between this study and that of Kamien and Schwartz 
may be attributable to the game versus decision theoretic assumption. 
Therefore the answer to the question "is competition conducive to technical 
advance?" depends upon whether the firms' decision processes are more closely 
approximated by the game or decision theory analysis, and whether it is a fixed 
or flow cost which is most important in determining the date of successful 
innovation. 
When patent protection is imperfect, the answer is even more ambiguous. 
Although Kamien and Schwartz [7] report that in this case innovation is 
unambiguously delayed by an increase in the number of rivals, the game model 
does not confirm this. 
It is reasonable to suggest that the payoffs to innovation and imitation, PL and 
PF, respectively, are determined in a game of oligopoly following successful 
innovation. Since the total benefits to be extracted from the market are limited, 
the values PL and PF will depend upon the number of rivals among whom the 
market is to be divided. Now since PL= PL(n) and PF= PF(n), to determine the
effect of increasing rivalry on equilibrium production of knowledge we need to 
determine the sign of 
du;* _ du;* 'du;* dPL du;* dPF 
--- + -- + --dn dn 'CJPL dn '()pF dn 
.
The fi�st term may be of either sign, although it is negative for t near T. We
saw earlier t�at 'du;* /'dP L > 0, while au;* /'dPF � 0. Since both dPd dn and
dPrf dn are hkely to be negative, the sign of du;* /dn is ambiguous and will
de?end upon the nature of the n-firm oligopoly game solution. 
fhus the ef�ect of increasing rivalry is considerably more complicated when
P•Hent protection is imperfect. More precise specification of the mechanisms
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involved in the determination of PL (n) and PF(n) is required to generate 
unambiguous results. 
For illustrative purposes, consider the following example. Rewards are com­
pletely nonappropriable; PL = PF" Furthermore, consider the simple linear de­
mand-zero marginal cost oligopoly game where each firm captures PF = 
4P /(n + 1)2, where P is the value of a patent on the innovation, Then 
Now 
2PF/\e" 
u*(tz·P P )= -----------' ' ' F• F 
2 - (2n - l)PFA.2(e" - e'T)/r
4/\e" au;* fa PF= 2 
> 0 
(2-(2n-l)m] 
and dPF/ dn = -SP /(n + 1)3 < 0, it is clear that for this simple case du;'"'/ dn is 
negative for an t � T. 
Thus we can easily construct reasonable examples which reverse the results of 
Proposition 6 when imitators are able to appropriate some of the innovator's 
(potential) reward. 
6. EQUILIBRIUM WITH ENTRY 
Dasgupta and Stiglitz [2, 3] use a Loury-type model to determine equilibrium 
market structure for the case of perfect patent protection. In the context of this 
model, entry will occur until the number of rivals is n0 such that P(uf, ... , u:0) 
= 0. Since 
. 2P ( n-l) 
J'(u* u*)=P- >0 I• . .. ' n 2n - } -exp { PA2(n -1)(1-e'T)/r}
for all n, the equilibrium market structure requires that n0 = oo. The resulting 
Nash equilibrium strategies are 
ut (t,z) =}ill!, u;* (t,z; P, 0) = PA.e''.
These are the "competitive equilibrium" strategies using the definition of compet­
itive equilibrium as the limit of the n-firm Nash equilibrium as n � oo. 
Kamien and Schwartz [SJ have argued that perfect patent protection is 
inconsistent with perfect competition. Instead, they characterize "perfect compe-
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tition" as immediate imitation by infinitely many rivals so that each firm ''reaps 
a miniscule portion of the benefits of the innovation" (p. 56). 
In terms of the present model, this definition of perfect competition requires 
that PL (n) and PF(n) both approach zero as n approaches oo. Then we see that 
the "perfectly competitive" rate of knowledge acquisition, when innovators and 
imitators are equally rewarded in the amount PF(n), is
2P (n)A.e"
uf<'(t,z) = lim F = O' n->oo 2 - (2n - l)PF(n)A.2(e" - e'T)/r
for all t E [O, T]. 
With perfect competition defined as above, the results of this model coincide 
with those of Kamien and Schwartz [5]-technical advance is not a worthwhile 
undertaking for any individual firm. 
From this it is clear that the extent of appropriability of rewards is a critical 
determinant of competitive behavior. 
7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
We have developed a model of optimal resource allocation to R and D under 
the assumption of uncertain technical advance and in the presence of game­
playing rivals. We have found that the availability of perfect patent protection 
unambiguously increases the pace of technical advance. For the case of perfect 
patent protection, we have seen that increasing the number of rivals results in an 
increase in each individual firm's Nash equilibrium rate of investment in R and 
D. When imitators are able to appropriate some of the benefits, then a greater 
number of rivals has several conflicting effects, affecting not only the probability 
of winning, but the values of the payoffs to innovator and imitators as well. 
Depending upon the payoff structure, increased rivalry in this case may acceler­
ate or delay innovation. 
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